I empirically test whether firms engage in risk-shifting. Contrary to what risk-shifting theory predicts, I find that firms reduce investment risk when they approach distress. To identify the effect of distress on risk-taking, I use a natural experiment with exogenous changes to leverage. Risk reduction is most prevalent among firms that have shorter maturity debt and bank debt. I also find that risk reduction occurs in firms with tighter bank loan financial covenants. These findings suggest that debt composition and financial covenants serve as important mechanisms to mitigate debt-equity agency conflicts, such as risk-shifting, that are not explicitly contracted on. * I would also like to thank Rüdiger Fahlenbrach,
Introduction
How does corporate investment risk taking change when a firm has high leverage or approaches distress? In high leverage states of the world equity holders benefit from successful outcomes of high risk projects, while losses from unsuccessful outcomes are borne by debtholders. This asymmetry between who receives the gains and losses from a project could make it optimal for equity holders to maximize the amount of risk a firm undertakes when leverage is high. This hypothesized increased risk taking in a firm's investments, referred to as risk-shifting or asset substitution, could result in an overall cost to the firm (Jensen and Meckling (1976) ).
Concerns about the size, prevalence, and mitigation of these costs have been the focus of substantial theoretical work. 1 However, there is little empirical evidence on the size or pervasiveness of changes in investment risk taking when leverage is high or when a firm is in financial distress. The empirical challenges are two-fold. First obtaining a measure of the riskiness of a firm's overall capital expenditures is challenging in most settings. Second, distress and high leverage are not randomly assigned to firms. To the extent a corporate investment plan and high leverage/distress are jointly determined, or are caused by an omitted variable, obtaining clean identification of the effect of distress or leverage on risk taking is problematic. The contribution of this paper is to provide empirical advancements on both these fronts. First, I focus on a setting where a firm's investment risk taking is clearly defined by measures of investment risk from SEC disclosures. Second, I use quasi-random shocks to leverage to identify the effect of an increase in leverage and distress on investment risk taking. I use a setting in which investments can be categorized into two different types of activities, one that is high risk and one that is low risk. To do this, I focus on the oil and gas industry, where exploratory projects (high risk) are nearly six times more likely to result in an unproductive project than development projects (low risk). 2 Moreover, these categories 1 Existing theoretical work related to the size and mitigation of risk-shifting includes: Smith and Warner (1979) (covenants), Green (1984) (convertible debt), Barnea et al. (1980) (debt maturity), John and John (1993) (managerial compensation) . 2 The firms in my sample drilled a total of 12,574 exploratory wells of which 3,326 were unsuccessful have clear definitions outlined by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and are disclosed in SEC filings, so there is a standardization in these measures across firms and over time, which is typically unavailable in other settings. I construct a dataset from hand collected data on investment risks from the 10-Ks of 184 firms in the oil and gas industry. Using these risk disclosures, I test how the proportion of high risk investment to total investment changes as leverage increases as well as when firms approach distress.
Contrary to what risk-shifting theory would predict, in firm-level panel regressions I find that high leverage reduces the riskiness of a firm's investments. A one standard deviation increase in leverage reduces the proportion of a firm's high risk investments to total investment by 8.5% relative to the mean level of firm risk taking. I also find that the proportion of high risk investment to total investment is reduced by 21.6% for firm-years in which leverage is in the top quartile of the sample. Furthermore, this risk-reducing behavior also occurs in the years prior to declaring bankruptcy.
One concern with firm-level panel regression results could be reverse causality. For example, it could be that a firm increases its leverage because it is planning to reduce its investment risk in the future. Specifically, a firm, or its lender, may feel more comfortable with higher leverage if the firm has less cash flow uncertainty from its future investments.
Such an argument would suggest that firms are not reducing the riskiness of their investments because they have high leverage, but that they increase their leverage because they are planning to reduce investment risk in the future.
To address simultaneity and omitted variable endogeneity concerns and rule out other alternative explanations I use a natural experiment to test how risk taking changes with leverage during two significant commodity based negative leverage shocks in 1998 and 2008. I focus on firms with similar pre-event book leverage, but whose existing assets are differentially affected by the commodity price shocks due to different mixes of oil and gas assets. Despite similar pre-event book-leverage, the differential effect of the commodity price shocks result in (26.4%) , and drilled 88,277 development wells of which 3,809 were unsuccessful (4.3%). Additionally, in comparing reserve additions from discoveries relative to exploration capital expenditures, in 27% of all firm years, firms failed to add reserves through discoveries that exceeded their exploration spending.
the Merton (1974) (Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) ). Firms too, likely have incentives to ensure that they have a good reputation to ensure access to debt markets (Diamond (1989) ), which can affect their ability to pursue future positive NPV projects (Almeida et al. (2011) ). In the natural experiment setting, I find that risk reduction is most prevalent in firms with shorter maturity debt and bank debt. This suggests that debt composition is important for firm risk-taking in distress, and provides support for risk-reducing incentives and monitoring linked to banking relationships.
To further explore the role of banks in risk-reduction I assess the role of bank financial covenants. Banks in my sample do not place explicit covenants on exploration activity, however, financial covenants may allow the bank to exert some indirect control on firm risktaking activity. To test for this, I hand collect covenant data from credit agreements of firms in my quasi-natural experiment. I find that risk reduction behavior is most prevalent among firms that have stricter financial covenants and more financial covenants prior to the shock.
This result provides new empirical evidence that financial covenants may allow banks to exert indirect influence to reduce debt-equity agency conflicts that have not or cannot be explicitly contracted on, such as risk-shifting.
A key potential concern related to using commodity price shocks as part of an identifica-tion strategy is whether firms whose existing assets are adversely affected by a commodity price shock, may choose to undertake a different investment program for a reason other than the effect of the commodity price shock on leverage. To mitigate this concern I test whether there is a direct effect of changes in prior period reserves on firms' investment programs.
Thereby measuring how changes in reserves due to commodity prices affects investment, but without conditioning on ex ante leverage as in the natural experiment. I find in both the full sample and a limited sample (excluding the years of the natural experiment) that prior period changes in existing reserves due to commodity prices does not affect a firm's mix of exploratory versus development drilling. This is consistent with the view that the new projects a firm undertakes is likely going to be based on where the best new opportunities are, versus where its existing assets are.
Testing risk-taking policies in sub-samples of firms (e.g. firms with shorter maturity debt or bank debt), also helps rule out alternative non-debt related interpretations. Specifically, an alternative interpretation linked to different investment opportunities or other differences would need to relate risk-taking not just to firms whose leverage was adversely affected by a commodity price shock, but relate risk-taking to firms that received these leverage shocks and also had short maturity debt or bank debt. This raises the bar for alternative interpretations of my results.
Existing empirical literature has studied the risk-shifting incentives of equity holders in a variety of ways. Initial work by Andrade and Kaplan (1998) studies 31 firms in financial distress and finds no evidence that distressed firms made large or unusually risky investments or acquisitions. Rauh (2009) studies how risk taking in pension funds change in relation to the financial condition of a firm. Consistent with the findings in this paper Rauh (2009) finds that risk taking in pension funds is reduced as the financial conditions of a firm deteriorate. Parrino and Weisbach (1999) utilize simulation and find that risk-shifting is not a primary driver of capital structure decisions. Gormley and Matsa (2011) find that firms respond to exogenous increases in liabilities by undertaking diversifying acquisitions. Furthermore, survey evidence from Graham and Harvey (2001) suggests that risk-shifting concerns are the least important factor for CFOs in determining the maturity of debt a firm issues as well as whether a firm issues convertible bonds. Gormley and Matsa (2014) Research & Development (R&D) spending has also been used as a proxy for risk taking, however, due to the multi-year life cycle of typical R&D projects it is difficult to envision that an increase in R&D in a year of financial distress would result in an outcome the following year which could save the firm from further distress or bankruptcy. Alternatively, the primary project type for oil and gas companies, the drilling of a well, typically has a very short project length, ranging from a month to a few months depending on where the well is being drilled. Thus, it is plausible that a successful major exploratory well could alter the fortunes of a company in a short period of time. There is a strong empirical relationship between exploration capital expenditures and reserve additions from discoveries in a given
year. 4 This short project time-line also would suggest that if risk-shifting were to occur, it would be more likely to occur in this setting than in others. Furthermore, the higher than average capital intensity of this industry suggests that current period investment can have a large effect on the overall riskiness of the firm, whereas year to year changes in R&D may be less likely to influence the overall risk level of a firm.
This paper proceeds in the following order, Section 2 discusses motivation and related literature. Section 3 outlines the data that is used. Section 4 discusses identification and the empirical design. Section 5 reports the results of the empirical tests, and Section 6 concludes.
Motivation and Related Literature
Why might risk-shifting not be observed in empirical tests? A potential explanation that prior theoretical literature has focused on is the reliance of the Jensen and Meckling (1976) risk-shifting result on a single period framework; in other words, agents make decisions as if there is no tomorrow. Jensen and Meckling (1976) directly acknowledge that when their framework is applied to a multi-period setting different outcomes may occur:
"It seems clear for instance that the expectation of future sales of outside equity and debt will change the costs and benefits facing the manager in making decisions which benefit himself at the (short-run) expense of the current bondholders and stockholders. If he develops a reputation for such dealings he can expect this to unfavorably influence the terms at which he can obtain future capital from outside sources. This will tend to increase the benefits associated with "sainthood" and will tend to reduce the size of the agency costs. "
- Jensen and Meckling (1976) Existing theoretical literature using multi-period settings has suggested several possible explanations for why a firm may choose to not undertake risk-shifting. Diamond (1989) suggests that firms may avoid risk-shifting due to borrower reputational concerns, while Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) suggest that manager reputational concerns leads managers to reduce risky investment. Almeida et al. (2011) , suggest that concerns for the ability to fund future projects may cause firms to reduce risk, so that positive NPV projects can be funded in the future.
Covenants on loans and bonds may also play an important role in a firm's investment policies. While the clear accounting based definitions of investment risk used in this study enable tests on risk-shifting, they also would enable a financial covenant to be designed to limit the amount of capital being invested in high risk projects. However, in this setting, as with pension funds in Rauh (2009) 
Investment Risk Variable Definition
Each firm in the study provides disclosures for the "Costs Incurred in Natural Gas and Oil Exploration and Development, Acquisitions and Divestitures." These disclosures provide information on expenditures for high risk (exploratory) capital and low risk (development)
capital. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) provides clear guidance for the definitions of exploratory and development activities which I outline below:
Exploratory well -An exploratory well is a well drilled to find a new field or to find a new reservoir in a field previously found to be productive of oil or gas in another reservoir.
Development well -A development well is a well drilled within the proved area of an oil or gas reservoir to the depth of a stratigraphic horizon known to be productive.
I categorize all activities associated with exploratory drilling as high risk, this includes both the capital to drill and the capital to acquire the unproved acreage to drill. All activities associated with development drilling, which include the drilling of development wells and the acquisition of proved/producing acreage for development drilling, I classify as low risk.
Moreover, the total capital across all these categories is comparable to the figure reported in Compustat, although there are some slight differences due to the expensing of some types of capital expenditures for oil and gas companies. The unit of observation used in this study is firm-year, firm i in year t, so my primary measure of risk is calculated as the proportion of high risk projects to total costs incurred as shown below:
The difference in risk between high risk and low risk activities is also documented in the success rate of each activity type. In additional disclosures, firms disclose the number of successful wells and number of unsuccessful wells for both exploratory and development wells. The firms in my sample drilled a total of 12,574 exploratory wells of which 3,326 were unsuccessful (26.4%), and drilled 88,277 development wells of which 3,809 were unsuccessful (4.3%). Thus on average an exploratory well was nearly six times more likely to be unsuccessful than a development well.
In order to assess how exploratory capital expenditures affect a firm's reserve additions (e.g. project profitability), I plot the distribution of reserve additions divided by exploratory capital expenditures. A ratio above one indicates that a firm added more proved reserves from discoveries than it spent on exploration. As can be seen in Figure 1 , there is significant variability in the payoff of exploratory drilling in a given year. For example, in 27% of firm years, companies do not recover drilling costs. Alternatively, in 13% of firm years, companies gain 10x their investment in exploratory wells in the form of proved reserves.
Leverage and Distress Definitions
Existing literature has used different definitions of leverage. In this study I use a market and book based definition of leverage from Welch (2004) . The book leverage and market leverage definitions are outlined below:
Where E i,t is the equity market capitalization for firm i in year t, and D i,t is the book value of total debt for firm i in year t. Similarly, L i,t is the total liabilities for firm i in year t,
and A i,t is the book value of assets for firm i in year t. While the market leverage of a firm is bounded between 0 and 1 by construction, a firm could have a book leverage of greater than 1 if its liabilities exceed its assets. To ensure that coefficients retain an economically meaningful interpretation and minimize the amount of data that is excluded from the study I winsorize any values of book leverage greater than 1 to 1. Additionally, in all of my tests I use dummy variables for different leverage levels based on market leverage quartiles for the sample, this enables the measurement of any non-linear effects of leverage on investment risk taking. Several other controls are included in the main regressions, these include log of assets, market to book, and profitability.
I follow the method of Bharath and Shumway (2008) in calculating the Merton (1974) distance to default (DD) model probability of default. The Merton DD model uses an option framework to calculate the probability of default. It does so by viewing the equity as a call option on the value of a firm, and using the strike price for the option as the value of a firm's debt. By using the equity and debt values of the firm and the volatility of a firm's equity, the overall value of the firm and volatility of firm value can be calculated, using the iterative procedure outlined in Bharath and Shumway (2008) . The model provides a z-score which can be used to calculate a probability of default based on the normal cumulative density function. 
Summary Statistics
The primary definitions of leverage used are the market leverage and book leverage variables defined in the data section. The main measure of distress used is Merton DD default probability, which takes a value between 0 and 1. Additionally, leverage dummy variables are used to allow for non-linearity in the relationship between leverage and investment risk. 
Natural Experiment: Commodity Based Leverage Shocks
While the firm-level regressions outlined above could allow me to establish a basic relationship between leverage and investment risk, with some observables and time invariant heterogeneity controlled for, better inference can be achieved by using a natural experiment framework.
The natural experiment I use is two commodity driven leverage shocks. The commodity shocks I use in 1998 and 2008 were driven by unexpected economic collapses, which make them an attractive setting for a natural experiment. Specifically, the price collapse in 1998 was due to the Russian default and Asian financial crisis, these events were not anticipated.
In January 1998 futures contracts indicated natural gas prices of $2.46/mmbtu and oil prices Commodity prices are exogenous, as no single firm can control prices for oil or natural gas. The price collapses experienced by commodities in 1998 and 2008 influenced the leverage levels of firms differently based on 1) the amount of leverage a firm had prior to the shock and 2) the precise exposure a firm's existing assets had to the commodity shock based on its mix of oil and natural gas reserves.
The initial difference-in-differences framework can be thought of as 1) the difference between pre-shock and post-shock behavior 2) the difference in behavior of firms more affected by the shock (treatment) and firms less affected by the shock (control). As mentioned above whether a firm is considered treatment or control is a function of commodity prices on its leverage via the revaluation of its existing assets. Book leverage prior to the shock, can be calculated directly from Compustat data. To calculate the effect of the commodity price shock on a firm's leverage I can take advantage of additional unique disclosures in the oil and natural gas industry. Specifically, in every 10-K a firm has to report the different components of changes to the dollar value of its reserves (acquisitions, discoveries, commodity prices etc.), with this data I can isolate the precise effect of commodity prices on a firm's reserves, distinct from any management action to alter or improve dollar reserves. This enables me to calculate what a firm's book leverage would be if the only event that occurred was the commodity shock, the calculation is as follows:
BookLeverage i,P ost = T otalLiabilities i,P re T otalAssets i,P re + $ChangeReservesP rices i,P ost I use a regression form of difference-in-differences to test the effect of leverage on investment risk in a natural experiment framework. The specific regression I estimate is below:
Where the T reatment i,t is a 0 or 1 dummy variable constructed from the reserve based book leverage calculation outlined above and Controls i,t−1 are similar to the panel regression. The key coefficient of interest in this specification is β 3 , which measures how the treatment group is differentially affected by the shock. For example, if firms whose leverage is more affected by a commodity shock reduce investment risk after the shock, then β 3 would be negative. A concern in the interpretation of the firm-level regression results reported in Table 2 is how reverse causality might explain the observed coefficient estimates. It could be the case that firms are increasing leverage because they are planning to reduce investment risk, and are more comfortable with a higher debt load as they reduce their investment risk. One test of the plausibility of the reverse causality argument is in Table 3 , which reports how firms change their risk taking prior to bankruptcy. There are only 16 bankruptcies in the sample, yet the reduction in risk in the years prior to bankruptcy is large enough that there is statistical power even for this small number of observations. The economic interpretation of the coefficient in specification (1) is that in the year prior to bankruptcy firms reduce investment risk taking 23.8% relative to the investment risk taking of the mean firm. A result inconsistent with the reverse causality explanation above, as firms that are in distress and about to declare bankruptcy are less likely to be increasing their leverage deliberately.
Results

Firm Level Panel Regressions
Natural Experiment
A key assumption when using a natural experiment framework is the conditionally random assignment of treatment. Treatment in the setting of my natural experiment is based on the effect of a change in existing assets caused by commodity price shocks on leverage. Because leverage is a firm decision, pre-shock differences in leverage may be a cause for concern regarding the conditionally random assignment assumption. As Table 4 Panel A shows, there are economically significant and statistically significant differences in leverage between all firms and the treatment firms. This is not surprising given that pre-existing book leverage affects a firm's probability of being treated. Interestingly, treatment firms are very similar across other observable dimensions, when compared to the other firms in the sample.
To mitigate concerns regarding pre-shock differences in leverage I undertake two matching without replacement (Panel C). In both panels the matching procedure results in firms with similar pre-shock book leverage. Additionally, with the exception of log assets in Panel C, firms in the treatment and control groups match well across market to book, profitability, and market leverage. I hand collect information on executive compensation to calculate CEO delta and vega for the matched samples. 5 I also calculate the percentage of production hedged across treatment and control groups. As Table 4 shows, firms are ex ante similar across these risk and incentive measures. Table 5 reports the effect of the commodity price shock on treatment and control firms.
Specifically, the shocked book leverage reported is based on the book leverage prior to the shock (book leverage as of Dec 31, 1997 or Dec 31, 2007 , adjusted only for the effect of the change in commodity prices on a firm's existing assets. This variable is unaffected by any management actions that occur during the period of the negative commodity price shock.
Because shocked book leverage is the variable that determines treatment, it is not surprising to see large economically significant and statistically significant differences between the treatment firms and other firms. Additionally, there are also economically significant and statistically significant differences between treatment firms and control firms in Merton DD default probability and market leverage. Panel B and Panel C of Table 5 indicate that despite treatment and control firms having similar observable characteristics and similar pre-shock book leverage, the effect of the negative commodity shock on treatment firms, results in treatment firms being closer to distress than control firms. In essence, this framework relies on negative commodity shocks having quasi-random effects on firms with similar characteristics. Given that the differential effect of commodity price shocks on oil versus gas was unpredictable, this framework yields quasi-random assignment of treatment and control. Table 6 reports the results of a regression form of difference-in-differences. This specification uses exogenous variation in leverage caused by negative commodity shocks in 1998 and 2008 to identify the influence of leverage on investment risk taking. The key coefficient of interest is the coefficient for the interaction term T reatment i,t * P ost t which measures how firms with leverage that is more affected by the commodity shock change their investment risk relative to firms less affected by the commodity shock. This coefficient in specification (1) is negative and statistically significant across all specifications, and matching group methodologies. The economic interpretation of the interaction coefficient in (2) is that treatment firms reduce risk taking by 75.3% relative to the mean firm risk level in response to the leverage shock relative to the investment risk taking of control firms. 6 The control variables used in Table 6 are based on t-1 variables, or variables prior to the commodity price shock, as many of the controls themselves are affected by the commodity price shock they could be consid- Table 6 further mitigate some of the reverse-causality and omitted variable endogeneity concerns in the panel regressions, as the leverage changes in the natural experiment are driven by the effect of commodity prices on a firm's existing assets, which is outside of a firm's control.
Natural Experiment: Potential Explanations
A number of risk mitigation incentives may exist, which could relate to possible explanations of the results that are observed. To evaluate potential drivers of risk-reducing behavior, I undertake several tests across different sub-samples in the natural experiment. It should be noted that these sub-samples are not randomly assigned. However, analysis of these sub-samples may help provide some support for potential channels that could be affecting risk-taking.
Debt maturity may mitigate risk-shifting incentives (Barnea et al. (1980) ). To assess support for this, I subdivide my sample into firms that have above median debt maturity and below median debt maturity. As can be seen in Table 7 , firms with below median debt maturity reduce risk-taking. This result suggests that debt composition is an important input in risk-taking decisions of firms close to distress.
Whether a firm has bank debt or not, could also be important. For example, banks may monitor debt-holders more relative to other lenders. Additionally, borrowers may be particularly concerned with their reputation with a given bank, particularly if they are locked in to a banking relationship and have limited other debt financing options (Rajan (1992) and Sharpe (1990) ). I subdivide the sample based on firms that have high bank debt, relative to firms that have low bank debt. Table 8 reports these results, and shows that firms with above median bank debt reduce risk taking. This suggests that that borrower-bank relationships (Diamond (1989) and Almeida et al. (2011) ) may be important for risk-taking during times of distress.
To understand particular mechanisms that may be important for bank debt and riskshifting, I test whether bank financial covenants may have an indirect effect on risk-taking activity. While banks do not explicitly contract on exploration activities, they typically have financial covenants that firms must comply with. To test whether these financial covenants are an important mechanism for mitigating risk-shifting, I subdivide my sample firms into sub-samples based on how strict financial covenants for a firm is ex-ante. As Table 9 documents, firms that have tighter covenants prior to the shock ( (2) and (4)) and more covenants prior to the shock ( (6) and (8)) reduce risk-taking. 7 This result provides evidence that financial covenants may indirectly mitigate a number of debt-equity agency conflicts that are not explicitly contracted on.
Internal Validity
An important assumption when using a difference-in-differences approach in a natural experiment framework is the parallel trends assumption. That is, in the absence of treatment, would the treatment and control groups have behaved similarly. Table 4 provides evidence that the treatment and control groups used are similar across a number of observable dimensions, however, Table 10 takes an additional step in testing whether the treatment and control groups behave similarly in time periods that did not experience negative leverage shocks. In Table 10 I create placebo events in 2001 (three years after 1998) and in 2005 (three years before 2008), to see whether treatment and control firms behave similarly in these other time periods. I find that the interaction coefficient T reatment i,t * P laceboP ost t is not statistically significant in any of the specifications. This suggests that in other time periods the investment risk trends across these firms was similar or "parallel."
One concern with using a difference-in-differences framework in a natural experiment setting is that many factors that influence investment decisions, in addition to leverage, could be changing. In particular if changes in the value of a firm's existing assets has an impact on its risk taking for a reason other than changes to leverage (e.g. worse investment opportunities), it could be a concern for my identification. To test whether this is the case I report results in Table 11 which measure the effect of prior period changes in reserves due to commodity prices on investment risk taking. The coefficients for this variable are not statistically significant and are close to zero, suggesting that prior period changes in commodity prices are not of first order concern in making decisions regarding investment risk taking. I report results for both the full sample as well as for the sub-sample where the years used in the natural experiment are excluded.
The specifications I report in Table 7 and Table 8 also support the internal validity of my empirical tests. Specifically, for an alternative non-distress related explanation to be consistent with my results, it would not only need to relate to risk taking and firms that had large commodity based leverage shocks, but also to risk taking and firms that had shorter term maturity or more bank debt and large commodity based leverage shocks. This raises the bar significantly for alternative explanations.
Conclusion
Whether firms engage in risk-shifting has been an open empirical question. Lack of data and adequate measures of risk, and the endogeneity of leverage and risk taking have meant this question has not been able to be addressed directly. I use a setting which has quasi-random shocks to leverage and objective measures of investment risk, from SEC disclosures, to test whether firms engage in risk-shifting. I find that firms reduce risk, rather than increase risk, when leverage is high and when they get close to distress.
Prior theoretical literature outlines several reasons for why firms may have incentives to reduce risk taking in distress. Firms likely have incentives to ensure that they have a good reputation to ensure access to debt markets (Diamond (1989) ), which can affect their ability to pursue future positive NPV projects Almeida et al. (2011) . I am able to highlight channels linked to debt maturity and borrower-bank relationships as being important for risk reduction in times of distress. I show that financial covenants are an important mechanism for mitigating risk-shifting, and that these covenants serve to mitigate debt-equity agency conflicts that may not be explicitly contracted on. The evidence in this paper suggests that risk-mitigation incentives and monitoring by banks outweigh risk-shifting incentives in investment decision making for the average firm. This table contains summary statistics for the variables used in the firm level panel regressions used in this study. The risk ratio is defined as the proportion of capital invested in high risk projects (exploratory activities) to total capital expenditures. Market leverage is defined as the market value of equity divided by the market value of equity plus the book value of debt (Welch 2004) . Book leverage is defined as total liabilities divided by total assets. In order to be included in the sample a firm-year must 1) be in SIC 1311 (Crude Oil and Natural Gas) 2) be U.S. domiciled and file a 10-K. To mitigate outliers book leverage values are winsorized at 1, and profitability and market to book variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. The distance to default is based on the Merton (1974) bond pricing model, as implemented by Bharath and Shumway (2008 The dependent variable in these regressions is the risk ratio for firm i in year t . A firm's risk ratio is calculated as the proportion of capital expenditures invested in high risk projects relative to all capital expenditures. All regressions include firm level fixed effects and time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm, with t-statistics reported in brackets below the coefficient estimates. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. This table reports firm-level regressions that document how investment risk changes for a firm in the years prior to bankruptcy. The dependent variable in these regressions is the risk ratio for firm i in year t . A firm's risk ratio is calculated as the proportion of capital expenditures spent on high risk projects relative to all capital expenditures. Dummy variables are inserted based on the number of years prior to bankruptcy, for example in the year immediately prior to declaring bankruptcy the variable "One Year Prior to Bankruptcy Dummy" is equal to 1, and equal to 0 for all other firm-years. All regressions include firm level fixed effects and time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm, with t-statistics reported in brackets below the coefficient estimates. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. Hedge percentage is the percent of total production a firm has hedged. Differences in group means are reported along with p-values, * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. Table 4 . Differences in group means are reported along with p-values, * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
Reserve Increase Due to Discoveries/Exploratory Capex
RiskRatio i,t = α + β 1 Distress i,t-1 + Controls i,t-1 + TimeFE t + FirmFE i + ε i,t RiskRatio i,t = α + β 1 LeverageD i,t-1 + Controls i,t-1 + TimeFE t + FirmFE i + ε i,tRiskRatio i,t = α + β 1 OneYearPriortoBankruptcyD i,t + β 2 TwoYearsPriortoBankruptcyD i,t + β 3 ThreeYearsPriortoBankruptcyD i,t + Controls i,t-1 + TimeFE t + FirmFE i + ε i,t
Pre-Shock Comparison
Post-Shock Comparison
Post-Shock Comparison This table reports results from a regression form of difference-in-differences. The first difference is pre-shock vs. post-shock, while the second difference is high leverage shock vs. low leverage shock. The dependent variable in these regressions is the risk ratio of firm i at time t. Firms are divided into treatment and control groups based on the effect of the commodity shock on leverage. For the firms that have implied book leverage in the top quartile due to the commodity shock, the variable Treatment is equal to 1 and 0 otherwise. The two leverage shocks used in this regression are in 1998 and 2008, the years of the shocks are excluded from the sample, therefore the pre-post comparisons compare 1997 (post = 0) to 1999 (post = 1) and 2007 (post = 0) to 2009 (post = 1). (1) and (2) report regression estimates for the matched sample with replacement, (3) and (4) report estimates for the matched sample without replacement, (5) and (6) report estimates for all firms in the sample during the event years. Control variables have been previously defined, after the shock occurs these variables are fixed at their last pre-event values, as they are affected by the shock (for example the size control used for the 1999 post period is based on year end 1997 size). The dependent variable in these regressions is the risk ratio for firm i in year t . All regressions include firm-event fixed effects and time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm, with t-statistics reported in brackets below the coefficient estimates. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. (Table 6) to test for the effect of bank debt on risk taking. The specifications subdivide the data by firms that have below median bank debt, and above median bank debt. The dependent variable in these regressions is the risk ratio of firm i at time t. These regressions are estimated on the matched sample, without replacement. All regressions include firm-event fixed effects, time fixed effects, and firm type-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm, with t-statistics reported in brackets below the coefficient estimates. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. This table reports results from a regression which alters the prior difference-in-differences regression (Table 6) to test for the effect of credit agreement financial covenants on risk taking. Specifications (1) through (4) subdivide the data by firms that have below median credit agreement covenant strictness and above median covenants strictness in the years prior to the leverage shocks (1997 and 2007) . Covenant strictness is calculated using the method of Ertan, Karolyi, and Ostromogolsky (2013) , and is based on the financial covenant that a firm is closest to violating, given the historical volatility of the financial ratio or figure used for the covenant. This measure satisfies the requirements laid out by Murfin (2012) for measuring covenant strictness. Covenant information was hand collected and calculated from firm 10-Ks and credit agreements. Specifications (5) through (8) proxy covenant strictness by the number of covenants. There are a number of firms that have median covenant strictness of 2, therefore the subsamples do not have an even number of firms. The dependent variable in these regressions is the risk ratio of firm i at time t. These regressions are estimated on the matched sample, without replacement. All regressions include firm-event fixed effects, time fixed effects, and firm type-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm, with t-statistics reported in brackets below the coefficient estimates. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
Differences-in-Differences
Covenant Tightness Covenant Count
Absorbed by TimeFE t Absorbed by TimeFE t Absorbed by FirmEventFE i Absorbed by FirmEventFE i This table reports estimations from a regression form of differences-in-differences. The first difference is the pre-placebo shock vs. post-placebo shock, while the second difference is the treatment firms used in Table 6 vs. the control firms used in Table 6 . Placebo shocks are based on moving the 1998 shock three years forward to 2001 and the 2008 shock three years backward to 2005 (Note: data is not available for having a placebo shock in 1995, so I move the placebo event three years forward instead). The dependent variable in these regressions is the risk ratio of firm i at time t. The matching and sample composition for (1) to (6) is the same as what is described in Table 6 . All regressions include firm-event fixed effects and time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm, with t-statistics reported in brackets below the coefficient estimates. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
Differences-in-Differences
Matched 
Reserve Change/Assets i,t-1 0.009 -0.002 This table reports firm-level regressions which document the effect of high risk capital expenditures of different lags on reserves added from discoveries. The objective is to measure which lag of capex is most important for proved reserves added in a given year. For example, in specification (1) reserves added in a given year are regressed on the high risk capital expenditures (exploratory capital expenditures) spent in that year. All regressions include firm level fixed effects and time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm, with t-statistics reported in brackets below the coefficient estimates. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
Dependent Variable = Reserves Added From Discoveries/Assets
Reserves Added From Discoveries i,t = α + β 1 High Risk Capex i,t + TimeFE t + FirmFE i + ε i,t
